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DICTA

TAX SAVINGS BY CHARITABLE
CONTRIBUTIONS
CHARLES E. WORKS
Associate Professor, University of Denver College of Law

The federal and state governments have adopted the policy
of subsidizing charities to some extent by permitting taxpayers
to deduct charitable gifts under the income, gift, estate and inheritance tax laws. The resulting tax savings encourage the taxpayer to make such gifts. One of the basic reasons for this policy
is the fact that money given to charity is usually spent for purposes which are quasi-public, and governmental expenditures for
the public services performed by charities are thereby reduced.
The taxpayer who plans to save taxes by making charitable
gifts is in no sense a "tax dodger"; he is merely doing that which
his government is deliberately encouraging. No one should make
charitable gifts for the purpose of "beating the government out
of taxes". No one can improve his financial situation by such tax
saving.' However, most men have a strong desire to make charitable gifts, and they can secure the satisfaction of giving to a
worthy cause in which they are interested and at the same time
offset, to a large extent, the cost of the gift by securing a substantial tax reduction.
Possible tax savings can be very substantial even for the man
of moderate means; therefore, they deserve frequent consideration by lawyers. All lawyers have a general familiarity with the
statutes permitting tax deductions for charitable gifts. Frequently, however, there are difficulties in determining the various
tax effects of a particular transaction, or in drafting a will or
deed of trust so as to carry out all of the client's purposes with
the maximum tax saving. This paper will attempt to summarize
the tax
benefits and tax pitfalls pertaining to different types of
2
gifts.
Charitable gifts, or gifts to charity, as the phrases will be used
in this paper, refer to gifts which are deductible for tax purposes.
While the different taxing statutes vary slightly in defining such
gifts, the deduction applies generally to gifts to religious, charitable, educational, scientific and literary institutions not operated
for profit. It is usually fairly easy to determine whether the donee
I See note 33, infra.
2 On this general subject, see: Brandis, Tax Savings by, Means of Charitable Gifts,
27 N.C.L. Rev. 69 (1948) ; Clark, Charitable Deductions, 6 N.Y.U. Institute on Federal
Taxation 1015 (1948) ; Polisher, Charitable Gifts, 7 N.Y.U, Institute on Federal Taxation 717 (1949). For a complete discussion written for laymen, see J. K. Lasser, How
Tax Laws Make Giving to Charity Easy (1948).
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comes within the statutory definition. In case of doubt, a ruling
should be requested from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue or
state tax administrator. Under state laws, the deduction may not
apply to gifts to a charity located outside the state.
TESTAMENTARY GIFTS

Testamentary gifts to charity produce very little tax savings
in small estates because the federal estate tax exempts the first
sixty thousand dollars in an estate, and .the Colorado inheritance
tax has a minimum rate of 17.6%. In the case of large estates,
the tax saving may be very great because the federal rate goes
as high as 77 %. A gift to charity will reduce the tax in the taxpayer's highest bracket so that the remaining estate will pay a
tax at a lower rate. If the decedent's assets consist of a business,
it may be necessary to liquidate the business at a sacrifice to raise
money to pay a tax on the whole estate; leaving part of the estate
to charity may reduce taxes to an amount which can be paid from
other assets. If a testator owns property of uncertain value,
troublesome and possibly expensive questions of valuation can be
eliminated by leaving such property to a charity.
Section 812 (d) of the Internal Revenue Code and Section 15
of the Colorado Inheritance Tax Law permit a deduction in full
of all amounts left to charity. The interaction of the federal and
Colorado statutes will result in a comparatively small Colorado
inheritance tax saving, so this discussion will center on the federal
law. The federal deduction is the net amount transferred to the
charity after payment of any administrative expense which may
be chargeable against the gift.
Outright Gifts by Will
The deduction for a gift of money to a charity is the sum
actually received by the charity from the estate.
If there is a gift of specific property, the deduction is the
market value of the property at the date of death (or optional
valuation date). There will be no capital gains tax either against
the estate or against the charity at any time, and no capital loss
can be taken.
If the gift is of the residuary estate, any estate or inheritance
taxes payable out of the residuary estate in respect to other legacies will diminish the amount received by the charity, and the deduction will be limited to the amount actually received by the
charity. In case the federal estate tax is to be paid out of the residuary estate left to charity, the amount of tax to be deducted
from the residue and the amount of the charitable deduction
allowed in figuring such tax are two mutually dependent variables,
so that the use of an algebraic formula is necessary. 3 This compliHarrison v. Northern Trust Co., 317 U.

S. 476 (1943).
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cation may be avoided by providing that estate taxes shall be paid
out of the specific legacies and by making such legacies large
enough to meet the testator's wishes as to the net amount the
legatees are to receive.
Gifts to Charity of a Remainder Interest
If the testator wishes to provide one or more life estates with
a remainder to a charity (whether by trust or not), the deduction
will be the value at the date of testator's death of the remainder4
interest as computed by actuarial tables set out in the Regulations.
No deduction can be taken if the remainder is contingent or
if its value is not ascertainable 5. In Ithaca Trust Co. v. U. S. 0 the
court held that a power in the trustee to invade corpus to maintain the life tenant "in such comfort as she now enjoys" did not
defeat the deduction of the charitable remainder since the amount
of income would unquestionably be adequate without invasion of
corpus. But in Merchants National Bank v. Commissioner7 the
Court disallowed any deduction for a charitable remainder because the trustee had a discretionary power to invade corpus to
any extent necessary "for the comfort, support, maintenance and/
or happiness" of the life tenant. If the testator desires to give a
power to invade corpus, the power should be based on some "readily
measurable standard" 8 or limited as to amount, so that the deduction will not be lost. This is also important from an income
tax viewpoint. In the Merchants Bank case, supra, the trustee
sold some capital assets at a profit and sought to escape a capital
gains tax because the profit was ultimately to go to charity. The
Court held that the gain was taxable because the life tenant might
be given the profit under the power to invade corpus.
Instead of providing for a life estate with or without power
to invade corpus, the testator may wish to provide for definite,
fixed annuity payments to a relative with a remainder to charity.
The payments being fixed and certain, the actuarial tables can
be used to determine the present value of the remainder interest
which will be deductible. 9 The annuitant will pay income tax on
amounts received which are paid from income but not on amounts
paid from corpus. 10 If the trustee sells capital assets at a profit, there
will be a capital gains tax if there is any substantial possibility
that corpus will have to be used to pay the specified annuity."
Even if a testator has no desire to provide for a charity, every
will should contain an ultimate remainder of the residue to insure
4 Regulations 105, sec.
B.T.A. 1071 (1937).

'Regulations

81.10; Simpson v. U. S.,

252 U. S.

547

(1920); William Korn, 35

105, sec. 81.44 and 81.46.

0279 U. S. 151 (1929).
320 U. S. 256 (1943).
Henslee v. Union Planters Bank, 335 U. S. 595 (1949); note. 62 Harv. L. Rev. 1070 (1949).
'William Nelson Cromwell, 24 B.T.A. 461 (1931); Leonard S. Waldman, 46 B.T.A. 291
(1942).
.RC., sec. 22 (b) (3) and 162 (b) and (d).
"Commissioner v. F. G. Bonfils Trust, 115 F. (2d) 788 (C.C.A. 10th 1940).
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complete disposition of the estate under all possible contingencies;
a charity of a character certain to be in existence is admirably
suited for this purpose.
CharitableGifts and the Marital Deduction 12
A testator may avoid the tax on his estate entirely by leaving
his estate to his widow and to a charity in equal shares. This will
not have the apparent effect of giving his widow only one half
as much property as if he had left her his whole estate, because
in the latter case the estate tax would diminish the interest received by her-very substantially in a large estate. A testator may
go even further and leave one-half of his estate to his widow and
an additional $60,000 to his widow or children or any other person,
and there will be no tax on his estate if the balance of his property
is left to a charity.
The general effect of a testator's leaving half of his estate to
his wife so that his estate can take the marital deduction is not
to avoid estate taxes, but merely to postpone them and transfer
their incidence from his estate to his wife's estate (unless she can
make gifts free from gift tax and not in contemplktion of death).
If the family desires to make a gift to charity, the question of
when and by whom the gift should be made involves consideration
of many factors. Generally, taxes will be saved if the gift is made
by the will of whichever spouse has the larger estate, regardless
of which spouse dies first. Obviously, tax considerations will be
secondary to protection of the family. Nevertheless many situations permit a substantial tax. saving without prejudicing family
interests.
INTER VIVOS GIFTS

Large savings on federal income tax are possible by making
charitable contributions, as the deduction rdduces the tax in the
taxpayer's highest bracket. This tax saving in effect reduces the
net cost to the taxpayer of the charitable gift; the United States
is in effect contributing to the charity the amount of the tax reduction. For example, a taxpayer having a taxable income of $100,000
can make a $1000 gift to charity at a net cost of only $234.40; a taxpayer with a $20,000 income will have a net cost of $533.60 for
a $1000 gift; a taxpayer with a $10,000 income can make a $1000
gift at a net cost of $700.80. Appendix A shows the net cost to
the taxpayer of gifts in other tax brackets.
Gift Tax Deduction
Gifts to charity are exempt from the federal 13 and Colorado 14
gift tax. Even if made in contemplation of death, such gifts will
not be subject to estate or inheritance tax on the donor's death.
22

I.R.C., see.

812(e).

1 I.R.C., see. 1004 (a) (2) and (b) (2) (3).
"COLO.

STAT. ANN., C. 75A, see. 4

(1947 Cum. Supp.)
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If a gift is made for the benefit of both an individual and a
charity, only the value of the charity's interest is deductible, e.g.,
on a gift to A for life with remainder to a charity, the value of
the life estate is subject to gift tax, and the present value of the
remainder is exempt. 15 The relative values of the life estate and of
the remainder are determined by tables set out in the Regulations.' If the remainder is contingent17 so that its value is not ascertainable there can be no deduction.
Income Tax Deduction Allowable to Different Classes of Donors
(a) Gifts by individuals are deductible up to, but not exceeding, 15% of the adjusted gross income.' The individual loses the
full benefit of his deduction if he uses the optional tax table or
takes the standard deduction. Gifts by a married individual, filing
a joint return, are deductible up to 15% of the adjusted gross
income of both spouses. 19
(b) Gifts by corporations are deductible only up to 5% of
the corporation's net income, and only if the gift is to be used in
the United States or its possessions. 20 There may be a question
as to whether a gift by a corporation is ultra vires; 21 however, it
is not ultra vires for a Colorado corporation to make a charitable
gift.2 2 If the gift is made because of direct business benefits to be
received from the charity, it should be deductible as a business
expense even it if exceeds 5% of the net income; if the benefits
to the corporation are indirect, the deduction must be23treated as
a charitable contribution subject to the 5% limitation.
(c) Trusts and Estates are permitted a deduction without
limitation for any part of the gross income which is paid or permanently set aside or is to be used exclusively for charitable purposes.2 4 To take the deduction, a trustee need not show that sums
paid to charity are paid out of income receipts if they do not
exceed the gross income for the year. 25 However, one case has held
that a trustee's gift to charity of stock which was clearly corpus
and not income was not deductible, even though the value of the
26
stock was less than the gross income of the trust for the year.
There is a split of authority as to whether a trustee who has given
to charity the full amount of a long term capital gain can deduct
11

The M. D. Thatcher Estate, 38 B.T.A. 336 (1938).
ToRegulations 108, sec. 86.13 and 86.19(f).
IT Simon Guggenheim, 1 T.C. 845 (1943).
11I.R.C. sec. 23(o).
2
19Taft v. Helvering, 311 U. S. 195 (1940) ; Regulations 111, sec. 29. 3(o)l.
o I.R.C., sec. 23 (q).
"Landman, The Low Cost of Charity, 26 Taxes 151 (1948) ; Cousens, How Far Corporations
May Contribute
to Charity, 35 Va. Law Rev. 401 (1949).
2
2 COLO. STAT. AiiN. C 41, sec. 26(1) (1947 Cum. Supp).
21I.R.C., sec. 23 (a)
(1)
(B) ; Lasser, Corporate Charitable Payments, 4 Tax Law
Rev. 124 (1948) ; Landman, op. cit. supra, note 21 ; Clark, op. cit. supra, note 2 at 1025.
14 I.R.C., ec. 162 (a).
Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 301 U. S. 879 (1937).

W. K. Frank Trust v. Commissioner, 145 F. (2d) 411 (C.C.A. 3rd 1944).
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the entire amount 27or only the 50% which is treated as gross income
for tax purposes.
A deduction can be taken by a trustee for any money "permanently set aside" for a charity even if not paid out at the time.
So there can be a deduction for income accumulated for charity
if it is certain that it will ultimately go to charity and cannot be
diverted to other purposes. In creating any testamentary or
inter vivos trust partly for the benefit of individuals and partly
for the benefit of charity, it is important to provide that all accumulations of corpus from ordinary income or from capital gains
shall be dedicated to the charity and cannot be invaded to pay
annuities or to make discretionary payments to individuals. 2s
In What Year May Income Tax Deduction Be Taken?
A corporation on the accrual basis may deduct the gift in
the year it is voted by the directors if paid to the charity within
two and one half months after the close of the year.2 9 An individual donor can take the deduction only in the year in which the
gift is actually made, whether he is on the accrual or cash basis.
A gift of property is made when title passes. A gift of money is
made when actually paid. A pledge is not payment.
A check is
30
payment if the check is paid when presented.
It will obviously be advantageous for an individual donor to
equalize his gifts from year to year so that he does not exceed
the 15% limitation in one year and fall short of it in other years.
In Andrus v. Burnett 31 a donor transferred land to a charity, taking its notes which were payable annually over a period of years.
Each year as a note fell due he cancelled it, thus spreading the
gift over a period of years 'and getting a deduction each year.
Although the Court upheld these annual deductions, such a device
appears vulnerable to attack as a mere subterfuge. In the case of
gifts of money or property which is divisible, such as stocks or
bonds, there is no difficulty in making a pledge in one year and
spreading the actual transfers over a period of years to obtain
the maximum deductions.
Gifts of Capital Assets
If a gift of property is made, the deduction is measured by
the market value of the property at the time of the gift. Since -the
capital gain and loss provisions apply only to sales, exchanges
and involuntary conversions, there is no capital gain or loss
" Commissioner v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 163 F. (2d) 208 (C.C.A. 2nd 1947);
Benedict v. U. S., 81 F. Supp. 717 (Ct. Clms. 1949).
"Moorman Home for Women v. U. S. 42 F. (2d) 257 (W. D. Ky. 1930); Commissioner v.
F. G. Bonfils Trust, 115 F. (2d) 788 (C.C.A. 10th 1940) ; Commissioner v. Estate of Upjohn,
124 F. (2d) 73 (C.C.A. 6th 1941) ; Estate of Langenbach v. Commissioner, 134 F. (2d) 590
(C.C.A. 6th 1943) ; William P. Allen, 6 T.C. 597 (1946).
9 I.R.C., sec. 23 (q), as amended Oct. 25, 1949.
0 Estate of Modie J. Spiegel, 12 T.C. 524 (1949) ; Acq. I.R.B., 1949-20.
"50 F. (2d) 332 (C.C.A. D.C. 1931).
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realized on making a gift.3 2 A very great tax saving results to a
donor who makes a gift of property which would be subject to a
capital gains tax if sold. He can deduct the present market value
of the property and at the same time avoid any tax on the capital
gain. For example, an individual may own stock now worth
$15,000 which cost him $5000 and which he has held over six
months. If he sells the stock he will have to pay a capital gains
tax of $2500. If he gives the stock to charity, he will pay no capital
gains tax and can deduct $15,000 for income tax purposes. If he
has ordinary income of $100,000, he will save $12,183.75 on his
income tax. The net cost of his gift is only $2,816.25 ($15,000
less $12,183.75), and in addition he has freed himself from a present or future capital gains tax of $2500 on a sale of the stock.
The same principle applies to the gift of a building which has a
market value in excess of its depreciated value on the taxpayer's
books. A gift of property on which there is a very large capital
gain made by a taxpayer in a high bracket may actually leave the
taxpayer in a better financial condition
than he would be in if he
33
sold the property and made no gift.
Gifts of Property Representing Unrealized Income
In I.T. 3910, 34 a farmer gave to charity wheat which he had
raised and which was worth more than 15% of his adjusted gross
income. He had taken deductions for all the expenses of raising
the wheat. The Bureau ruled that the value of the wheat became
realized income when the gift was made and must be reported as
income, subject to a charitable deduction of 15% of the farmer's
adjusted gross income. This holding is contrary to the general
rule that income is not realized when a gift is made, but it has
some supporting authority. 35 In I.T. 3932 36 the Bureau ruled that
a farmer who gave cattle to his son realized the value of the cattle as income at the time of the gift. These rulings may or may
not be followed by the courts, but they indicate a real danger if
a donor attempts to avoid tax by giving away unrealized income.
They may cast some doubt on the statement made in the preceding
paragraph that there will be no capital gains tax on the gift of a
capital asset to charity. There is, however, a real distinction between the two situations, and it would appear that under existing
regulations and existing decisions there would 3be
little danger
7
of a capital gains tax on the gift of a capital asset.
2 L.O. 1118, Dec., 1943 Cum. Bull. 148.
11The taxpayer has not actually made money by making a gift. He could have kept the
property instead of selling it or giving it away.
4 1948-1 Cum. Bull. 15.
3 Helvering v. Horst, 311 U. S. 112 (1940) ; Commissioner v. First State Bank of Stratford,
168 F. (2d) 1004 (C.C.A. 5th 1948), certorari denied 335 U. S. 867.
" 1948-2 Cum. Bull. 7.
1 Miller, Gifts of Income and of Property, 5 Tax Law Rev.
1 (1949) ; Note, 62
Harv. Law Rev. 1181 (1949). In Rudco Oil & Gas Co. v. U. S., 82 F. Supp. 746 (Ct.
CIms. 1949), the government agreed that there was no realization of a capital gain
when a corporation made a distribution to stockholders of appreciated assets.
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Gifts of Life Insurance

If a life insurance policy is irrevocably assigned to a charity,
the donor may deduct the present value of the policy. If the policy
is not fully paid up, the cash surrender value is considered to be its
present value; if the policy is paid up or is a single premium policy,
present replacement cost is considered to be present value. 38 If
assigned to a
the donor pays premiums on a policy irrevocably
39
charity, each premium paid is a deductible gift.
INTER VIVOS TRUSTS

A living trust is the most flexible vehicle for a donor to use
when he has several purposes to accomplish, especially if he wishes
alternative dispositions of his funds on different contingencies. It

will be impossible to consider here all of the infinite variations
possible in a trust and the intricate tax problems that may be involved. Nevertheless, a discussion of the over-all tax effects of a
few simple types of trusts may be helpful to illustrate the possible
tax savings. If money or property is put in trust solely for charitable purposes, the tax problems are essentially the same as in the
case of an outright gift to charity. We are here concerned with the
situation where a trust is created for both charitable and private
purposes. Usually it will involve a remainder to a charity, subject
to income payments or fixed annuity payments either to the donor
or to one or more other individuals, or to both.
Revocable Trusts

In general, under all the tax laws, a donor who has retained a
power to revoke, alter, amend or terminate a trust (and in some
instances if the power is vested in a third person or in the donor
and a third person), is treated as if he were still the owner for
tax purposes. 40 Thus the grantor will be taxed on the income of a
revocable trust whether it is paid to him or not. He will be permitted to take a deduction for any income paid to charity. There will
be no gift tax on the creation of the trust, but any income paid to a
third person will be subject to a gift tax when paid. There will be
estate and inheritance taxes on the donor's death in respect to
property given to individuals, but not in respect to property given
to a charity.
There appears to be no substantial tax advantage in creating
a revocable trust; yet many donors may prefer a retention of control over their property to the tax advantages of an irrevocable
trust.
The grantor of a trust will be taxed on the income of the trust,
if it may be used to pay the grantor's obligations or to support his

3nEppa
U. S. v. Ryerson, 312 U. S. 260 (1941);
Hunton, 1 T.C. 821 (1948).

Regulations 108. sec. 86.19 (i).

4oI.R.C., sec. 166, 167, 811 (d) ; Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner. 308 U. S. 39 (1939).
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dependents or to pay premiums on his insurance policies, 41 or if the
trust comes within the Clifford doctrine 42 because it does not run
over ten years or because the grantor or some third person may
have a sufficient administrative control or power to get direct or
indirect benefits from the trust. No trust should ever be drafted
in the expectation that the grantor will not be taxed on the income
therefrom without a study of the Clifford case, the regulations with
respect thereto and the court decisions applying the regulations.
It is also important to check the estate tax effects of the trust
to see that no gift to an individual has been made in contemplation
of death, or subject to a reserved life interest in the grantor, or
intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after death.
Even if the grantor has no possible interest or reversionary right
under the trust, it may now be taxed as part of his estate to the
extent that he may have created an interest in an individual who
can come
into possession or enjoyment only by surviving the
43
grantor.
Even if a grantor has no desire to make a gift to charity it is
still advisable to name an ultimate remainderman; a charity so
organized that it will have perpetual existence is ideal for this
purpose.
Irrevocable Trusts
If a trust is irrevocable and not taxable to the grantor or his
estate under the doctrines discussed above, substantial tax savings
may result. There will be no income, gift, estate or inheritance
taxes on an interest passing to charity (provided the charity's interest is fixed and certain and not subject to any contingency or to
invasion for the benefit of an individual). The present value of
the interests given to charity will be deductible by the grantor for
income tax purposes (up to 15% of the grantor's adjusted gross
income) in the year in which the trust was created. Income payable
to individuals will be taxed to the recipient. There will be a gift
tax on the grantor to the extent of the value of corpus given to individuals. There will be no estate or inheritance taxes on interests
given to individuals. Let us see how this works out in a few typical
instances.
Example 1. An irrevocable trust reserving the income to
grantor with remainder to a charity. The grantor can deduct for
income tax purposes the value of the remainder interest,44 which
will be determined by the tables set out in the regulations.4 5 The
income received by the grantor will be taxed to the grantor. There
will be no gift tax, and no estate or inheritance taxes, since the
entire corpus passes to a charity on the grantor's death.
41 I.R.C.,

see. 167.
Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 831 (.1940) ; Regulations 111 sec. 29.22 (a)
*" I.R.C., sec. 811 (e) (3) as amended Oct. 25, 1949.
"I.T. 8707; 1945 Cum. Bull. 114.
"Regulations 108, sec. 86.19.
42

21-22.
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If capital assets were put into the trust by the grantor, there
should be no capital gain or loss to the grantor even though the
present value of the property is deductible for income tax purposes.
In an unpublished letter dated Dec. 4, 1946, the Commissioner expressly ruled that there would be no capital gains tax on appreciated assets in this situation. I have been unable to find any published ruling on this point. There is a split of authority as to
whether there would be a capital gains tax on the trustee if he
later sells such assets for more than the donor's basis. 46 If, instead
of creating a trust, the donor had transferred the assets directly to
a charitable corporation (exempt under Sec. 101 (6) of the code)
subject to a reserved life estate in the donor, there would be no
capital gains tax on a later sale by the charitable corporation as
it would be entirely exempt from taxation.
Example 2. An irrevocable trust to pay the income to a third
person with remainder to a chartiy. The grantor can deduct the
present value of the remainder interest. 47 The income will be taxed
to the third person. There will be no estate or inheritance taxes.
There should be no capital gain or loss to the donor if capital
assets were transferred to the trust. As to a possible capital gains
tax on a later sale by the trustee, the discussion under example 1,
supra, applies.
Example 3. An irrevocable trust reserving fixed annuity payments to the grantor with remainder to a charity.48 The grantor
can deduct for income tax purposes the present value of the remainder interest in the year in which the trust is created. The
grantor will pay income tax only on amounts paid to him out of
income even if his annuity payments exceed income. 49 If the annuity payments are less than actual income, there will be no tax on
the undistributed income if it is ultimately to be paid to the charity.
There will be no gift, estate or inheritance taxes. If appreciated
property were put into the trust, there should be no capital gains
tax on the grantor. On a later sale by the trustee there would be a
capital gains tax, at least to the extent that any of the profit might
be used to pay the annuity.
Example 4. An irrevocable trust providing annuity payments
to a third person with remainder to a charity. The tax effects are
the same as under example 3 except that the income tax on pay46 See

note 27, supra.
47 I.T. 1776 Dec., 1923 Cum. Bull. 151; G.C.M. 3016, June, 1928 Cum. Bull. 90.
48 This situation must be distinguished from a transfer of money or property to a

charity In consideration of the charity's agreement to pay an annuity to the transferror. The law is not well-settled as to such a transaction, but in general treats it as

the purchase of an annuity and taxes the annuity payments under I.R.C., sec. 22 (b)
(2). If the property transferred to the charity is worth more than the Insurance company price for a similar annuity, the excess is deductible as a charitable gift. Raymond
v. Commissioner, 114 F. (2d) 140 (C.C.A. 7th 1940); Gillespie v. Commissioner, 128
F. (2d) 140 (C.C.A. 9th 1942). There will probably be a capital gains tax if appre-

ciated property is transferred for an annuity agreement.

Hill's Estate v. Maloney, 58

F. Supp. 164 (N. J. 1944). See Lourie and Cutler, Capital Assets Sold on the Installment Basis, 26 Taxes 707 (1948).
4 I.R.C., sec. 22 (b) (B) and 162 (b).
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ments from actual income falls on the third person instead of on
the grantor, and there will be a gift tax on the present value of
the third person's interest.
Example 5. An irrevocable trust for payment of income to a
charity with reversion in the grantor. If the duration of the trust
is under ten years, it will be taxable to the grantor. If the trust
is for a period of more than ten years, there will be no income tax
on the trust income. 50 There will be no gift tax. The present value
of the charity's interest in the trust is deductible by the grantor
for income tax purposes. Such a trust enables a grantor to reduce
income taxes for a period of time and still retain the future use of
the property. In the event that the grantor later decides that he
does not need the property, he can get further income tax deductions by giving to the charity additional gifts of his reversionary
interest in the trust. Such gifts will not be subject to gift tax.
Estate and inheritance taxes will apply only to the value of whatever reversionary interest remains in the grantor on his death.
TAX SAVING UNDER COLORADO INCOME TAX ACT

So far as income tax is concerned, the above discussion has
all been directed to the Federal law. The Colorado Income Tax Act
is identical with the federal law as to all questions affecting inter
vivos gifts, excepting that it contains no provisions similar to those
of I.R.C. 22 (b) (3) and 162 (b) relating to annuity payments to a
donee or to the beneficiary of a trust. Under Colorado law probably such payments would be treated as gifts and not taxable to
the donee even if actually paid out of trust income. 5' Tax savings
under the Colorado law will be comparatively small because the
tax is based on net income after a deduction for federal income tax.
Since a charitable gift reduces the federal tax, it increases the taxable income under Colorado law by the amount of the federal tax
saving. This increase in net income partially offsets the charitable
deduction under Colorado law.
CHARITABLE FOUNDATIONS

Much has been written regarding tax savings through the
creation of a charitable foundation, 52 and a large number of foundations have been created in recent years. The word "foundation"
is not descriptive of any particular form of organization; it may be
a charitable trust, 53 though it usually is organized as a corporation
not for profit. It may be created inter vivos or by will. It is so
organized as to be tax exempt under I.R.C. Sec. 101 (6). Usually
6"U.

S. v. Pierce, 137 F. (2d) 428 (C.C.A. 8th 1943)
Regulations 111, see. 29.22(a) 21(c).
61 See Burnet v. Whitehouse, 283 U. S. 148 (1931) decided -before see. 22" (b) (3) was enacted.
2 "How to -Have Your Own Foundation," Aug. 19477 Fortune 108; Casey, The

Foundation in Estate Planning, 6 N.Y.U. Institute on Federal Taxation 98 (1948);
Clark, Charitable Contributions, 6 N.Y.U. Institute on Federal Taxation, 1015, 1031
(1948) : Ross, A Primer on Charitable Foundations and the Estate Tax, 27 Taxes 116
(Feb. 1949) ; note, 34 Va. Law Rev. 182 (1948).
"Commissioner
1949).

v.

Edward Orton, Jr. Ceramic Foundation, 173 F.

(2d)
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the control is retained in the grantor or his family either as trustees
or as a self-perpetuating board of directors. Some foundations engage in a competitive business but escape taxation because the income goes to charity.
The tax advantages from charitable gifts discussed throughout this paper apply to gifts to foundations. It is rather doubtful
whether the use of a foundation gives any additional tax advantages over other forms of charitable gifts. It does provide several
other advantages in certain instances.
If a man's principal asset is a business, his estate may have
to sell the business at a forced sale or give up the controlling interest in order to raise sufficient money to pay estate taxes. Control
may be retained through voting and non-voting stock, but this won't
pay the taxes. In such a case a foundation may be highly desirable.
If a large interest in the business is given to a charitable foundation, it will reduce the estate tax so that it may be possible to pay
it out of life insurance proceeds or other funds. Control of the
business may be retained either through control of the foundation
or by giving the foundation only non-voting stock or both.
The use of a foundation gives a man great flexibility and control over his charitable gifts. If he gives 15% of his adjusted gross
income to the foundation each year, he can get the maximum charitable deductions. He can then have the foundation spend the money
for charity in such manner and at such times as he sees fit.
Most of the other so-called tax advantages of a foundation are
nothing but abuses which either would not be permitted today if
discovered or will probably be prohibited by an amendment to the
law in the near future. The Bureau of Internal Revenue is concerned over the abuse of foundations, and the C. I. 0. and other
groups are seeking legislation to stop these abuses.5 4 A foundation
may incidentally pay a reasonable salary to a relative 55 or have its
funds charged with an annuity, 56 but if it is created to aid the
57
grantor, it is not entitled to tax exemption.
It is proper for a donor to control his gifts to charity, but it
is not proper for him to use control of a tax exempt foundation for
his personal or business purposes, such as padding the payroll with
relatives, having the foundation loan him money or finance his business enterprises or make other business deals with him or for his
financial benefit. There is considerable agitation at the present
time for a law prohibiting tax exempt organizations from engaging
in a competitive business.
CONCLUSION

A person who desires to make gifts to charity can do so and at
the same time reduce his taxes so that the amount of his gift does
4
'

Fiester, " Taxes, Dynasties and Charity," Apr. 9, 1949, The Nation 414.
Home Oil Mill v. Willingham, 68 F. Supp. 525 (Ala. 1945).

See case cited note 58, supra.
"Scholarship Endowment Foundation v. Nicholas, 106 F. (2d) 552 (C.C.A. 10th 1939).
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not all come out of his own pocket. This is not only legitimate but
is encouraged by the federal and state governments. Great care
must be exercised to determine the exact tax effect in any unusual
or complicated situation; this paper does not purport to cover all
of the many angles that might come up in a particular transaction.
Any attempt to obtain tax advantages by a transaction which is
not bona fide or by concealment of facts is not only illegal, but is
extremely dangerous. Finally, before taking any action which will
have long range effects, consideration should be given to possible
changes in the law through court decisions or through legislation.
APPENDIX A
APPROXIMATE NET COST OF CHARITABLE GIFT
AFTER FEDERAL INCOME TAX SAVING
(Under Revenue Act of 1948)

Txable net income

Under $ 2,000
4,000
2,000 to
6,000
4,000 to
8,000
6,000 to
10,000
8,000 to
12,000
10,000 to
14,000
12,000 to
16,000
14,000 to
18,000
16,000 to
20,000
18,000 to
22,000
20,000 to
26,000
22,000 to
32,000
26,000 to
38,000
32,000 to
44,000
38,000 to
50,000
44,000 to
60,000
50,000 to
70,000
60,000 to
80,000
70,000 to
80,000
80,000 to
90,000 to 100,000
100,000 to 136,719.10
136,719.10 to 150,000
150,000 to 200,000
over 200,000

$

Rate of tax on
Highest income
Bracket:

16.6%
19.36%
22.88%
26.40%
29.92%
33.44%
37.84%
41.36%
44.00%
46.64%
49.28%
51.92%
54.56%
57.20%
60.72%
63.36%
66.00%
68.64%
71.28%
73.92%
76.56%
78.32%
80.3225%
81.225%
82,1275%

Net cost to donor per
$100 Gift.

$83.40
80.64
77.12
73.60
70.08
66.56
62.16
58.64
56.00
53.36
50.72
48.08
45.44
42.80
39.28
36.64
34.00
31.36
28.72
26.08
23.44
21.68
19.68
18.78
17.87

The above figures are based on taxable income after all deductions and exemptions except
the gift in question. Married taxpayers filing a joint return should consider one half of the
joint taxable income as taxable net income for purposes of the above table.
If there are net taxable long term gains taxed at the alternative rate they should not be
considered as part of taxable net income in using the above table.
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CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN TAXATION
BY ALBERT J. GOULD AND KENNETH L. SMITH
of the Denver Bar

FAMILY PARTNERSHIP

While the community property law has eliminated the family
partnership issue so far as the Federal Government is concerned
from the beginning of the year 1948, family partnership law is
important from the standpoint of the State of Colorado which,
however, follows for the most part the federal decisions. For these
reasons we shall continue to cite family partnership cases.
In Crosley v. Campbell, U.S.D.C.,N.D. of Ill., 11/17/49, where
a son was involved, and in Green v. Arnold, U.S.D.C., N.D. of Tex.,
10/11/49, where two minor daughters were involved, and in Trapp
v. Jones, U.S.D.C., W.D. Okla., 12/2/49, where a son was involved,
each of these courts held the partnership valid because all partners
in each case controlled their share of the profits and there was evidence of a bona fide intent to form a partnership.
In Morris, 13 T.C. 127, a wife contributed her capital as a limited partner from funds given to her by the husband without any
restrictions upon her use thereof. Although, being a limited partner, she performed no services, the partnership was upheld following the Culbertson case. Apparently, we may conclude now that
the capital contribution of the wife may be made from funds given
to her by the husband without restriction as to her use thereof,
provided the husband retains no control of her share of the partnership profits and the facts indicate an intent to form a bona
fide partnership.
SELLING APPRECIATED CORPORATE ASSETS

In U.S. v. Cumberland Public Service, 1/9/50, the U.S. Supreme Court in effect held that a sale of assets by stockholders after
liquidation will be imputed to the corporation only if in fact they
act as the corporation's agent in making the sale or if the sale
plainly is a sham and actually constitutes a sale by the corporation. Anyone having this problem should compare this case with
Court Holding Company case, 324 U. S. 331, where the court ruled
that a sale by stockholders was a sale by the corporation.
EDITOR'S NOTE: Inasmuch as the Board of Governors of the Colorado Bar Association
decided as an-economy measure, to discontinue the loose leaf service, the monthly comments of
Messrs. Gould and Smith will henceforth be carried as a regular department of Dicta.
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INCOME AND GIFT TAXATION OF DIVORCE
PROPERTY SETTLEMENTS
WM. L. BRANCH AND R. A. LAUTERBACH
of the Denver Bar

The itching palm of the tax collector may materially increase
the woe of the unhappy spouse facing a divorce and property settlement. For example, suppose that a husband and wife, in connection with a contemplated divorce, agree that the husband will
pay the wife the sum of $450,000 by transferring to her corporate
stock for which he had paid $150,000. The door is open to the
Commissioner to assert that upon the transfer the husband has
realized a taxable gain of $300,000. Whether the agreed settlement is made in cash (thus eliminating the income taxable gain
feature) or in property, the Commissioner may, none the less, assert that a taxable gift was made in some amount. Bureau efforts
to tax transfers in connection with divorce settlements are of comparatively recent origin, and the case law is in an early stage of
development. Future litigation will be required to settle many of
the questions. However, some pitfalls can presently be anticipated
and avoided since the tax result of settlements in connection with
divorce largely depends upon the language of the instruments and
the divorce decree.
It is a well settled general principle of income tax law that a
taxable gain or loss may be "realized" where property is transferred in payment or satisfaction of a legal obligation. For example, suppose a taxpayer owed a debt of $100 which he paid by
transferring to his creditor a share of stock which was worth $100
but which he had earlier purchased for only $25. By his transfer
of property which cost him $25 to settle an obligation of $100, he
has "realized" a gain or profit of $75 which is taxable income. And
whether the gain is taxable as ordinary income or as a long term
capital gain depends upon the nature of the property transferred
in settlement of the obligation. This principle has been applied in
a great variety of factual situations and in many instances, where
the claim or obligation satisfied was an unliquidated one, it has
been held that the value or amount of the unliquidated claim was
the equivalent of the fair market value of the property transferred
in satisfaction thereof.
This principle has been applied to divorce settlements by the
Second and Third Circuit Courts, and in each instance certiorari
was denied. The first case was Commissioner v. Mesta I wherein a
2 123 F. (2d) 986, 28 AFTR (C.C.A. 3rd. 1941)
U. S. 696.

(Reversing 42 B.T.A. 933). cert. denied 316
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settlement agreement was made very shortly after a wife had filed
a divorce action. Under the settlement agreement the husband
agreed to deliver to his wife certificates for 5,200 shares of corporate stock and certain other personal property. The contract
contained provisions under which the parties agreed to release
and discharge each other from all claims or demands; and it specifically provided that the property to be conveyed to the wife was
"in full settlement and satisfaction of all claims and demands on
the part of Mrs. Mesta for her maintenance and support, and in
lieu of all rights which she may now have, or hereafter acquire,
against the property of Mr. Mesta, as wife, widow, or in any manner arising out of or resulting from the relationship of husband
and wife * * * ". Shortly thereafter a hearing was had upon the
divorce action and a final decree was entered. The decree did not
incorporate the agreement or make any provisions for alimony or
support, it being the law of that jurisdiction (Pennsylvania) that
permanent alimony could not be decreed when an absolute divorce
is granted. Pursuant to the contract and after the entry of the
decree, the taxpayer husband transferred and delivered the stock
and other property to his wife. The fair market value of the stock
so transferred was $157,000, whereas its original cost to the
taxpayer husband was only about $7,500. The Commissioner assessea an income tax contending that the husband, by this transfer,
realized a gain in the amount of the difference between cost and
fair market value, which gain (about $150,000) was taxable as a
long term capital gain. The Circuit Court held that the taxpayer
and his wife had reached an agreement whereunder the taxpayer
contracted to give his wife shares of stock and other consideration
in lieu of a legal obligation to support her; that the contractual
obligation thus imposed upon him was merely a substitute for the
obligation imposed by the law of Pennsylvania to support his
wife; and that he therefore delivered the stock in partial discharge
of this obligation. The court went on to hold that Mesta thereby
realized a taxable gain. In answer to the contention of the taxpayer
and the holding of the Board of Tax Appeals below, that there was
no way to measure the amount or value received by the taxpayer
upon the disposition of the stock, the court said:
The fair market value of the property or the benefit received
by Mesta for the stock may be difficult to ascertain, but in the absence of any other value being shown we think it is proper to take
fair market value. In the case at bar the amount of the taxpayer's
obligation to his wife was fixed in part in terms of stock by the
parties themselves who really dealt at arm's length with one another. It was so found by the Commissioner, and the taxpayer has
not rebutted the presumption that the Commissioner's ruling is correct. We think that we may make the practical assumption that a
man who spends money or gives property of a certain value for an
unliquidated claim is getting his money's worth.

DICTA
MESTA CASE FOLLOWED IN SECOND CIRCUIT

The second of the two cases above referred to is Commissioner
v. Halliwell.2 In this case the wife had commenced an action for
divorce. While the action was pending, the taxpayer and his wife
agreed, subject to approval of the court, that in the event of divorce she should have custody of the minor child and he would pay
her as alimony and for support of the child a lump sum consisting
of cash and certain securities which were specifically described. On
the date the agreement was executed the wife also executed a release of all rights to share in her husband's estate upon his death.
Thereafter a divorce decree was entered awarding the wife an absolute divorce with custody of the child and containing findings as
to the value of the husband's estate. The decree recited that "securities and cash'of the approximate value of $462,551 are a reasonable portion of the defendant's estate to be assigned to the plaintiff
as provided by and in compliance with the terms of the agreement
aforesaid." The decree also directed the husband to transfer to
the wife, "as alimony and in full (sic, discharge) of his obligation
for the support of said minor child," the specified securities and
cash; and it adjudged that upon delivery thereof the husband
should be "discharged of all past or future obligations for the
support of" the wife and child. At the date of delivery the securities were worth some $462,000, whereas cost to the taxpayer husband was only $150,000. As in the Mesta case, supra, the Commissioner asserted that the husband realized a taxable gain of
over $300,000, being the difference between the cost of the securities transferred and their value at the time of such transfer. The
Second Circuit sustained the Commissioner, expressly agreeing with
and following the decision in the Mesta case.
These two cases indicate that subsequent litigation may be
expected to apply to divorce settlements the general principle of
income tax law that a transfer of property in satisfaction of an
existing legal obligation is a transaction producing a taxable realization of gain. However, the scope of the application of this principle is presently in doubt. In the light of subsequent gift tax cases,
it is possible that a transfer to obtain release of support rights may
be a satisfaction of a legal obligation and hence a taxable realization of gain, whereas a transfer in settlement of marital property
rights may be simply a gift which does not produce "realization"
of gain. 3 But it is also possible that a transfer pursuant to a
2131 F. (2d) 642, 30 AFTR 442 (C.C.A. 2d, 1942) (Reversing 44 B.T.A. 740), cert. denied,
319 U. S. 741.
'The possibility that the making of a gift is a transaction which produces a taxable "reali-

zation" of gain is not within the scope of this discussion.

Based upon language in Helvering v.

Horst, 311 U. S. 112, 61 S. Ct. 144, 24 AFTR 1058 (1940), the Commissioner ruled in 1948 that
a farmer donating raised products to a charitable organization is required to include in gross
income the fair market value of such products (I.T. 3910, 1948-1 Cum. Bull. 15), and that a
livestock raiser who made a bona fide gift of raised cattle to his son is required to include
in gross income the fair market value of the raised cattle (I.T. 3932, 1948-2 Cum. Bull. 7).
These rulings illustrate an extension of the concept of "realization" of -gain. Such extension

is of doubtful validity in regard to gifts generally.
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divorce decree may result in a taxable realization of gain irrespective of the nature of the rights settled by the decree.
THE GIFT TAX CONSEQUENCES

Before considering some of the cases involving the gift tax
aspects of divorce settlements, the Supreme Court's gift tax decisions involving antenuptial settlements require brief mention.
The gift tax statute provides that a tax shall be imposed upon
"the transfer * * * of property by gift" 4 and that:5
Where property is transferred for less than an adequate and
full consideration in money or money's worth, then the amount by
which the value of the property exceeded the value of the consideration shall, for the purpose of the tax imposed by this chapter, be
deemed a gift * * *

The Regulation 6 thereunder states that transfers reached by
the statute are not limited to those where a common law "consideration" is absent but embraces as well:
• * * sales, exchanges, and other dispositions of property for a
consideration in money or money's worth to the extent that the
value of the property transferred by the donor exceeds the value of
the consideration given therefor. However, a sale, exchange, or
other transfer of property made in the ordinary course of business
(a transaction which is bona fide, at arm's length, and free from
any donative intent), will be considered as made for an adequate and
full consideration in money or money's worth. A consideration not
reducible to a money value, as love and affection, promise of marriage, etc., is to be wholly disregarded, and the entire value of the
property transferred constitutes the amount of the gift.

In 1945 the Supreme Court in two companion gift tax cases 7
held that the release before marriage of prospective marital property rights did not constitute "consideration" and that an antenuptial settlement was a taxable gift. In Merrill v. Fahs, the taxpayer, twice married and about to marry again, contracted with
his prospective bride to set up certain trusts for her benefit in
return for her release of all rights that she might acquire in his
property as his wife or widow, excepting her right to maintenance
and support. The parties married, and the legally enforceable
agreement was performed. The Commissioner assessed a gift tax
upon the full value of the property transferred. The Supreme
Court upheld the Commissioner, holding that the bride's release
of dower and other marital rights did not constitute "adequate
and full consideration" within the meaning of the gift tax statute set forth above. In reaching this result, the Supreme Court
construed the gift tax as being in pari materia with the Federal
Estate Tax- statutes. The estate tax in several sections uses sim4 I.R.C.

Sec. 1000.
Sec. 1002.
'Regulations 108, Sec. 86.8.
Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U. S. 308, 65 S. Ct. 655, 33 AFTR 587 (1945) ; and Comm. v. Wemyss,
324 U. S. 303, 65 S. Ct. 652, 33 AFTR 584 (1945).

'I.R.C.
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ilar phraseology, that is, "adequate and full consideration in
money or money's worth." But it also contained an express provision stating that "a relinquishment or promised relinquishment
of dower, curtesy, or of a statutory estate created in lieu of dower
or curtesy or of other marital rights in the decedent's property or
estate, shall not be considered to any extent a consideration in
money or money's worth". The effect of the Supreme Court's
decision in the Merrill case was thus to read into the gift tax statute the express provision which appeared in the estate tax act
that a release of dower, etc. does not amount to a consideration.
In the other case, Comm v. Wemyss, 8 the antenuptial agreement was negotiated for the reason that the taxpayer was about
to marry a widow whose right to income from her deceased husband's trust would cease upon her marriage. Because of her unwillingness to suffer the loss of her trust income by remarriage,
the taxpayer agreed to transfer to her certain property. The
Commissioner asserted a gift tax on the full value of the property
so transferred, and here again the Supreme Court sustained the
Commissioner. In this case the Circuit Court of Appeals had reversed the Tax Court, holding that the transfer was not a taxable
gift because the prenuptial agreement was an arm's length bargain
without any donative intent. To this the Supreme Court said:
Had Congress taxed 'gifts' simpliciter, it would be appropriate
to assume that the term was used in its colloquial sense, and a
search for 'donative intent' would be indicated. But Congress intended to use the term 'gift' in its broadest and most comprehensive
sense. (Committee reports and cases cited). Congress chose not to
require an ascertainment of what too often is an illusive state of
mind. For purposes of the gift tax it not only dispensed with the
test of 'donative intent.' It formulated a much more workable external test, that where 'property is transferred for less than an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth,' the excess
in such money value 'shall, for the purpose of the tax imposed by
this title be deemed a gift * * *.' And Treasury Regulations have
emphasized that common law considerations were not embodied in
the gift tax.
DONATIVE INTENT NOT CONTROLLING

Not only did the Supreme Court thus eliminate any requirement of donative intent, at least insofor as an antenuptial agreement is concerned, but it also, in the Wemyss case, went on to
approve the Tax Court's finding that the transfer in the circumstances of that particular case was not one made in the ordinary
course of business within the meaning of the above-quoted Regulation. And the Supreme Court made it clear that the "consideration" required to prevent a transfer from being a gift is a money
consideration of benefit to the donor, and that a detriment to the
donee is not an adequate and full consideration in money or money's
See note 7 supra.
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worth. In reaching this conclusion, the court emphasized the
point that the gift tax is aimed to reach those transfers which
withdraw property from the donor's estate for estate tax purposes
and that to hold otherwise would defeat the purpose both of the
gift tax and estate tax statutes.
The Tax Court had earlier held that antenuptial transfers or
payments for release of dower or curtesy by an intended spouse
were taxable gifts. However, in 1943, in Herbert Jones,9 the Tax
Court made a distinction between antenuptial agreements and
divorce settlements. In that case, prior to suit for divorce, the
taxpayer and his wife through their attorneys had negotiated a
property settlement to be effective upon the granting of the divorce.
The divorce complaint alleged and the answer admitted that "all
property rights of plaintiff and defendant have been settled and
adjusted and no order of the court is requested in reference thereto". An absolute divorce decree was subsequently entered, whereupon the parties executed an agreement witnessing the fact that
the taxpayer had paid over to his wife cash and property of a
value of $122,000 effecting a complete, full and final settlement
of all claims of each in the property of the other. The Commissioner asserted a gift tax upon the full amount of $122,000. The
Tax Court held that the payment and transfer did not constitute
a taxable gift. It distinguished the case of an antenuptial settlement by regarding the payment as having "occurred in satisfaction of the wife's right to support by her husband and as an incident of their divorce." In this view, the Court regarded the
transfer as being in settlement of a present and existing liability
of the husband to support the wife, in contrast to an inchoate or
indefinite right of dower which, prior to or during marriage when
no divorce is contemplated, may be too uncertain and indefinite
to be then measured in terms of money. The Court regarded the
settlement of the wife's right to support as being a quid pro quo
for the transfer and as constituting a consideration in money or
money's worth for the purpose of the gift tax statute. Also, the
Court viewed the settlement as having been made in an arm's
length business transaction for consideration, without donative
intent, and therefore not a "gift" within the meaning of the statute. The opinion also contained a suggestion that if the transfer
h-d been in satisfaction of a decree of divorce containing a pro,on for the wife's support, that factor would supply considera.ion in money or money's worth and prevent the transfer from
being a gift.
Despite the Commissioner's opposition, the Tax Court thereafter held in several cases that a release by a spouse of the marital
right to support is the release of an existing, legally imposed
obligation which can be valued in money and which constitutes a
1 T.C.

1207 (1943),
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"consideration in money or money's worth" within the meaning
of the gift tax statute and that a transfer for release of support
rights is thus not a taxable gift. After the Supreme Court's decisions in the Merrill and Wemyss cases, supra, the Commissioner
adopted this view, ruling in E.T. 19 (1946) that for the purpose
of the gift tax a release of support rights may constitute "consideration in money or money's worth". That ruling, however,
makes a clear cut distinction between support rights and marital
property or inheritance rights. Under E. T. 19 the Commissioner's position is as follows:
(a) A release of support rights may constitute a consideration in money or money's worth;
(b) The Bureau will determine the reasonable value of the
support rights, and the excess of the value of the property transferred over the value of such support rights
will be taxed as a gift;
(c) A release of property rights or inheritance rights is not
"consideration in money or money's worth" to any extent;
(d) In the absence of a reasonable allocation made by the
parties in connection with such a settlement, the Bureau
will make its own reasonable allocation between the
amount transferred for release of support rights and the
amount transferred for release of other marital rights.
THE TAX COURT AND THE COMMISSIONER AT VARIANCE

The Tax Court has not, however, followed this ruling in regard to marital property rights. Stemming from its language in
the Jones case, supra, the Tax Court's subsequent opinions contain statements to the effect that where married persons deal
with each other over settlement of their respective rights and
obligations arising out of the marriage, then the settlement is a
business transaction, negotiated at arm's length, and is without
donative intent and is therefore not a gift within the meaning of
the statute. This attitude has been evident particularly in those
cases where the negotiations were conducted through attorneys
and where the settlement was arrived at only after bargaining
between them and especially in the cases where some bitterness
or hostility between the husband and wife was evident.
Likewise stemming from its language in the Jones case, but
largely upon the authority of the Second Circuit Court's decision
in Commissioner v. Converse,1° the Tax Court has held that an
obligation relating to marital property rights imposed by an agreement incorporated in a divorce decree constitutes "an adequate and
full consideration in money or money's worth" and that a transfer
in settlement thereof is not a taxable gift. In the Converse case,
1

163 F.

(2d)

131, 35 AFTR 1607. (C.C.A. 2d, 1947).
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a husband and wife had entered into a separation agreement under
which the husband agreed to pay $1,250 per month to the wife
during her lifetime in consideration for her release of all marital
rights. Thereafter the wife sued for divorce in Nevada, alleging
in her complaint that she and her husband had already agreed
to a settlement of property rights. The husband appeared and
by answer denied that the agreement was fair and just and alleged that a single payment would be for the best interest of the
parties. After the trial in which this was one of the issues litigated, and during which the parties had agreed upon the amount
of a single payment, the divorce court entered a decree of absolute
divorce. Such decree ordered the husband to pay the wife $625,000
in cash in lieu of the monthly payments as provided by the separation agreement. The decree amended the agreement to this extent
but otherwise incorporated it into the decree. The Tax Court held,
that no taxable gift resulted upon the authority of its earlier decision in the Jones case, despite the fact that the Converse case
arose after the Supreme Court decisions above mentioned. Between the time of trial in the Tax Court and the decision on appeal,
the Commissioner had issued E.T. 19. Therefore, on appeal, the
Commissioner contended that the payment was a gift to the extent that it exceeded the reasonable value of the wife's right of
support and that the case should be remanded for a finding by
the Tax Court as to such value. The Second Circuit affirmed the
Tax Court, but not on the Tax Court's distinction between antenuptial and postnuptial agreements. The Circuit Court held the
divorce Court's decree, upon litigation of the issue, was a money
judgment and that the payment was not a gift because it was
made in discharge of the judgment debt which would have been
deductible for estate tax purposes, had it remained unpaid at
Converse's death :11
The underlying reason for taxing as gifts transfers made only
in consideration for the release of marital rights in accordance
with antenuptial agreements, as shown by the Wemyss and Merrill
cases, is that the estate and gift tax statutes are in pari materia.
Sanford's Estate v. Commissioner, 308 U. S. 39, 60 S. Ct. 51, 84 L.
Ed. 20. Where, as here, there was the discharge of a money judgment which, had it remained unpaid until it became a debt against
the respondent's estate, would have been allowed as a deductible
claim in computing an estate tax, the transfer which discharged that
debt during the respondent's life is not taxable as a gift. On the

contrary it was the payment of a liquidated debt created by the
judgment and the discharge thereby of the respondent's obligation
to pay that debt was an adequate and full consideration in money or
money's worth for the transfer.

Thus, the Tax Court has held, contrary to the Commissioner's
ruling in E.T. 19, supra, that transfers in settlement of both support and property rights are not taxable gifts where negotiated
22See note 10 supra.
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in an arm's length fashion, and that transfers in settlement of
marital property rights only (support rights being eliminated)
are not taxable gifts where made pursuant to a divorce decree
or pursuant to a negotiated settlement agreement incorporated
decree. See Edward B. McLean 12 and Norman
into a divorce
13
Taurog.
In the Taurog case the taxpayer husband and his wife entered
into a settlement agreement under which community property of
a value of about $236,000 was to be divided, $118,000 worth to
be given over to the wife. In addition, the husband agreed to pay
the wife stipulated annual amounts as and for her future support and maintenance during her lifetime or until her remarriage.
Subsequently a decree of divorce was obtained which incorporated
by reference, approved, and adopted the settlement agreement
previously negotiated. The Commissioner assessed a gift tax on
the $118,000 worth of property set over to the wife in settlement
of her property rights. But the Tax Court held the transfer was
not a gift, relying principally upon the Second Circuit's decision
in Converse, saying :14
The Court thereupon based its decision squarely upon the proposition that the amount which the taxpayer in that case paid to his
divorced wife was paid to her in pursuance of the judgment of a
Court of competent jurisdiction and therefore was in discharge of an
obligation 'and the discharge thereby of the respondent's obligation
to pay that debt was an adequate and full consideration in money or
money's worth for the transfer.'

Both in the Taurog case and in the McLean case the Tax Court
stated that E.T. 19 was invalid insofar as it does not also except
(as constituting full and adequate consideration) transfers made
to settle presently enforceable claims.
COURT OF APPEAL OVERRULES TAX COURT

However, in July of last year, the Second Circuit seriously
impeached the validity of the Tax Court's prior decisions along
the lines above mentioned. In Commissioner v. Estate of Josephine
S. Barnard15 a husband and wife had entered into a separation
agreement whereunder the wife promised to pay the husband the
sum of $50,000 in return for his relinquishment of any claims on
her property "so that her estate shall go and belong to the person
or persons who become entitled thereto by will," etc. The agreement also provided that in the event of a divorce or decree of
separation between them, the agreement could be incorporated
into such decree, but that no such insertion should alter or affect
the terms and conditions of the agreement. At the time the writ2 11 T. C.. ...... (1948) CCH Dec. 16,620.
13 11 T. C ........ (1948) CCH Dec. 16,729.
"4See note 13 supra.
15 49

Prentice-Hall par. 72,554 (C.A. 2d, 1949).
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ten agreement was executed, the parties entered into an oral agreement to the effect that if the wife should obtain a divorce, she
would pay an additional $50,000 into a previously established
trust of which the husband was the life beneficiary. About two
months later the wife obtained a Nevada divorce. The decree incorporated the written agreement but contained no provision in
regard to the payment required by the parties' oral agreement.
After the decree was entered, the wife made the $50,000 payment
to the trust pursuant to the oral agreement. The Commissioner
assessed a gift tax upon both of the $50,000 payments. The Tax
Court held that the $50,000 paid pursuant to the written agreement, which was subsequently incorporated into the divorce decree, was not a taxable gift, but that the $50,000 payment made
pursuant to the oral agreement was taxable as a gift. The Second
Circuit, upon cross-appeals, held that both of the payments were
taxable as gifts. In so holding the Circuit Court opinion made
the following points :16
1. Upon the authority of Merrill v. Fahs, supra, a relinquishment of marital property rights is not "adequate and full
consideration" for the purposes of the gift tax.
2. No distinction can be made between an antenuptial settlement and a settlement upon a separation agreement. The
latter is no more of a business transaction than the former.
Even though negotiated through bargaining, a transfer pursuant to a separation agreement is not a transaction made
in the ordinary course of business which is bona fide, at
arm's length, and free from donative intent so as to be considered under the statute or regulation as being made for
an adequate and full consideration in money or money's
worth.
3. The mere fact that the separation agreement provisions
were incorporated in the divorce decree does not supply
the otherwise missing consideration so as to make the
payments not a gift. Specifically, the Court distinguished
its earlier decision in Converse by pointing out that in
that case the divorce court had decreed a lump sum payment in lieu of monthly payments provided for by the
separation agreement and that as a result the decree created of its own force a judgment debt owed by the taxpayer. In contrast, in the instant case the payment was
made pursuant to the agreement before divorce proceedings were instituted and furthermore the agreement itself
provided that it would not be affected by inclusion in a
decree.
4. The Circuit Court expressly approved the dissent of Judge
Disney in such cases as McLean and Taurog, above menI8

See note 15 supra.
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tioned, and also stated that the Converse case had been
cited well beyond the scope of its decision in some of the
Tax Court's opinions.
SUMMARY OF WHERE WE STAND

The relatively recent litigation of income and gift tax issues
in connection with lump sum and property settlements upon divorce leaves many questions unanswered. In general the Commissioner's position on the gift tax aspect under E.T. 19 appears
to be fairly sound. The distinction between support rights as
constituting "consideration" for purposes. of the gift tax and
marital property or inheritance rights as not constituting such
a consideration is probably justified. The Tax Court's emphasis
on the factors of a lack of donative intent and the presence of
arm's length bargaining as negativing a taxable gift in instances
involving transfers wholly or partially in settlement of marital
property rights incidental to divorce appears unjustified.
A wife's right to support is a presently existing, legal obligation imposed upon the husband, the release of which probably
constitutes a "consideration in money or money's worth" for the
purposes of the gift tax. The wife's right to support can be
valued partially through the use of actuarial tables which take
into account the husband's life expectancy, the wife's life expectancy, and the possibility of the wife's remarriage. For income
tax purposes a transfer of property (not cash) in settlement of
support rights may give rise to a taxable gain on the part of the
transferor, whether or not such transfer is pursuant to a decree.
Where the husband and wife through actual negotiation and
arm's length bargaining arrive at an agreed or compromised value
to be placed upon the wife's right to support, such agreed value
incorporated into a separation agreement will probably be accepted by the Commissioner unless it is manifestly unreasonable.
Such an evaluation of the wife's right to support would be less
likely to be questioned if it is subsequently incorporated into a
decree of divorce and if the payment or transfer is made in satisfaction of the decree. A value fixed by a divorce court upon litigation of the issue would probably be immune from attack. Where
a lump sum settlement or payment is made pursuant to a settlement agreement and no allocation is made by the parties as to
the portion thereof attributable to a release or satisfaction of the
wife's right to support, the Bureau will make its own evaluation
of the right of support.
A release of marital property rights probably does not constitute an "adequate and full consideration in money or money's
worth" within the meaning of the gift tax statute. A payment or
a transfer of property to obtain a release of such marital property
rights now appears taxable as a gift, even though such payment
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or transfer may be made pursuant to a settlement agreement which
is negotiated in the same manner as if the parties were strangers
to one another and after bargaining and negotiation through
attorneys. The absence of an actual donative intent is immaterial,
and the transaction is not one in the ordinary course of business
negotiated at arm's length within the meaning of the Regulation.
For income tax purposes a transfer of property in release of marital
property rights should likewise be construed as a gift and not as
a satisfaction of a legal obligation; hence, no taxable gain should
arise by virtue of the transfer.
However, if settlement on account of marital property rights
is made pursuant to a decree, so that the payment or transfer may
be regarded as being in satisfaction of the obligation imposed by
the decree, then the opposite result may follow-the payment or
transfer may not be a taxable gift, and if property is transferred,
a taxable gain may arise.
Although the present confused state of the litigation now
precludes decisive tax predictions, some suggestions can be made
for avoiding or minimizing income and gift taxes on contemplated
settlements:
(a) If the settlement contemplates payment of cash only, no
income tax on the husband can arise by virtue of the
payment. Gift tax can be avoided by making the payment
in discharge of a legal obligation of the husband. All or
substantially all of such payment should be allocated to
discharge the wife's rights of support, and preferably
the payment should be pursuant to and in satisfaction
of a money judgment for such support contained in the
decree.
(b) Where a contemplated settlement involves transfer of
property, or property and cash, a comparison of potential income and gift taxes upon the husband is necessary.
If the property has a "basis" considerably less than present fair value, and especially if the property is not a
"capital asset", the potential income tax on a possible
gain will make it advisable to attempt to avoid the taxable gain by clearly making a gift of such property.
Such a gift should be made prior to divorce to obtain
benefit of the so-called marital deduction under the recent admendment of the gift tax statute. In such case
a negotiated reasonable value of the wife's right of support should be reached and be satisfied with cash and
property in order of preference as follows: (1) cash;
(2) property having a basis equal to present value; (3)
property having a basis less than present fair value but
of a kind which, if sold, would produce gain taxable as
a long term capital gain. Low basis property and espe-
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cially low basis "ordinary" assets should not be transferred to satisfy the wife's right of support or to satisfy
a decree if it can be avoided. An outright gift of such
property to the wife is likely to be preferable taxwise.
(c) In most instances it will be desirable to fix specifically
the value of support rights by negotiated agreement and
to incorporate a finding of such value into the divorce
decree.

SOME WILL DRAFTING POINTERS ON
MARITAL DEDUCTION
T. RABER TAYLOR
of the Denver Bar

The federal estate tax is a tax on the right to transfer property. Death is the taxing event. The transfers taxed include those
becoming effective at death, e. g. by will or joint tenancy, and some
lifetime transfers prompted by the certainty of death, e. g. transfers in contemplation of death. Within the threat of the tax is any
property or interest in property of the deceased person. Property
includes life insurance, co-owner saving bonds, tenancies with
right of survivorship and other non-probate property, as well as
all probate property. These are included in the gross estate.
The tax, fortunately, is not computed on the gross estate but
only on the net estate. The net estate is equal 'to the gross estate
less the specific exemption and deductions. The specific exemption,
since 1942, is only $60,000. There is no exemption for life insurance. Deductions from the gross estate are allowed for debts,
claims (including the $2,000 Colorado widow's support allowance),
funeral expenses and expenses of administration.
The specific $60,000 exemption means that a family-with less
than $60,000 of worldly goods, including life insurance, has no federal estate tax problem. The higher prices since 1942 have swept
many families into the range of the federal estate tax. Middle class
married couples have not received any reduction in estate tax rates,
but they have received the tax relief afforded by the "marital deduction" created by Congress in 1948.
The marital deduction was created by Section 812 (e) of the
Internal Revenue Code. Just to set it out would take four~pages of
this size print. Many more pages of regulation interpret it.' Within
the limits of space, therefore, the marital deduction can only be
defined and a few will-drafting problems considered.
The marital deduction is a deduction from the gross estate. It
I Regulation 105, Section 81.47.
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is in addition to deductions for claims, funeral and administration
expenses. The amount of the deduction is not fixed. It can be $100
or $1,000,000.
The basic idea behind the marital deduction is simple, but its
application extremely technical. The basic idea is that a married
couple is treated as if each spouse owns one-half of the other's
property. A marital deduction is given, therefore, in an amount
equal to the value of any interest in property which passes or has
passed from the decedent to his or her surviving spouse either outright, or practically outright. Practically outright may include a
life estate or a trust, if and only if, it exactly qualifies under the
statutory rules. 2 The marital deduction, however, is limited to an
amount not to exceed 50 per cent of the decedent's adjusted gross
estate. Adjusted gross estate, a new term, is the gross estate less
the claims, funeral and administration expenses.
In 1940 Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Helvering & Hallock, an
estate tax case, said :3 "Distinctions which originated under a
feudal economy when land dominated social relations, are peculiarly
irrelevant in the application of tax measures now so largely directed toward intangible wealth."
Now an estate tax saving by way of the 1948 marital deduction may depend on whether our state adopted the Rule in Shelley's
Case.4 A marital deduction is easily won with outright devises and
legacies to the surviving spouse. Man and wife joint tenancy is also
an easy avenue to marital deductions.
These easy methods of transfer may have disadvantages. To
illustrate: John has $100,000 in property and life insurance. His
life insurance and will leave everything outright to his wife, Mary,
and nothing for their three married children. At his death the
claims and expenses are $10,000. No federal estate tax will be payable; but a return must be filed. The marital deduction equals 50
per cent of $100,000 less $10,000 or $45,000, but the specific exemption also is $60,000.
But on Mary's death there will be no marital deduction and
only a $60,000 exemption. To make things worse the 1948 law
wiped-out, as to a pre-deceased spouse's property, the deduction for
property previously taxed within five years. 5 So John's outright
gifts to Mary may merely postpone the estate tax until her death.
At her death there may be higher estate tax rates and the $60,000
specific exemption may be reduced.
The marital deduction is not available to every surviving
spouse. If husband John, by will, trusts and life insurance beneficiary agreements, leaves a $120,000 estate to pay the income to his
widow Mary, for her life and on her death to pay the principal to
2 I.R.C. See. 812(e) (1) (B) (C) (D)
& (F).
3309 U. S. 106.
4 The Rule is assumed to be in force in Colorado.
5 I.R.C. sec. 812 (c).

Barnard v. Moore, 71 Colo. 401, 406 (1922).
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their three children equally, no marital deduction will be available.
About $9,500 estate tax would be payable on the $60,000 net estate
after the $60,000 specific exemption. There is an advantage in this.
No estate tax will be payable on Mary's death; no worry will be
spent on possible higher estate tax rates or the reduction of the
$60,000 specific exemption.
To get the greatest benefit, an estate plan should combine the
advantages of the two illustrations. About one-half of the property
should go to the surviving spouse outright, or so it will qualify for
marital deduction; the other half should be protected from the
second death taxes on the death of the surviving spouse.
DO'S AND DON'TS IN WILL-DRAFTING

There are a growing number of families with over $120,000
and many fewer with a million. These are the middle class-farmers, ranchers, oil men, doctors, tradesmen. Some will-drafting
comments therefore may prove helpful:
6
(1) Don't use joint or mutual wills. There are legal problems,
7
and the surviving spouse may lose any marital deduction.
(2) Drafting the clause on payment of death taxes and claims
requires special attention. Section 812 (e) (1) (E) requires that
the value of the interest passing to the surviving spouse be reduced
by any estate or inheritance tax to be paid by the spouse or out of
her interest, and also reduced by any encumbrances upon her interest or property, or any obligation imposed by the decedent and
incurred by the surviving spouse with respect to the passing of
such interest.
To get the full marital deduction, some property not passing
to the surviving spouse must be charged with the payment of all
death taxes. The tax articles and law reviews are arguing about
how the best clauses are to be drawn. Marital deduction property
clauses couched in terms of decedent's gross estate have been criticized.8 It is almost impossible to draft a clause that will not require
algebraic computation. Careful attention should be given to estate
taxes on life insurance and non-probate property. Cautious drafting also will meet I. R. C. Section 826 by including a sentence on
waiver of reimbursement.
A careful search of the post-1948 tax, will, and estate planning literature yielded no suggestion on the payment of claims,
funeral and administration expenses. The Treasury administrative
policy is clear but unpublished. Unless the will clearly charges all
the before-death claims and after-death expenses against property
passing to the surviving spouse, the revenue agent will reduce the
110 Rocky Mtn. L. Rev. 287 (1938) ; 18 Rocky Mtn. L. Rev. 367-377 (1946) 61 Harv. L.
Rev. 675 (1948).
7I.R.C. Sec. 812 (e)

(1)

(B); Reg. Sec. 81, 47 a.

OTwo good articles are Casner. Estate Planning under the Revenue Act of 1948. 62
Harv. L. Rev. 413, 433 (1949) ; Gutkln and Beck, Will Clause8 and the Marital Deduction, 26 Taxes 1009 (1948).
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value of her qualified marital deduction interest by at least a prorata portion of claims and expenses. The Code talks about where
her " . . . interest or property is encumbered in any manner, or
where the surviving spouse incurs any obligation imposed by the
decedent ... ". Are unsecured before-death claims encumbrances?
Are funeral expenses, the $2,000 widow's support allowance, and
administration expenses " ... imposed by the decedent with respect
to the passing of such interest . . . ?" Careful drafting can avoid
worry about the answers to these questions.
A TRUST MAY QUALIFY FOR THE DEDUCTION

(3) Family and practical considerations are often against a
surviving spouse taking her inheritance outright, in which case a
trust is still the most effective device. The trust for the spouse can
qualify for the marital deduction. The law of future interests is
now being studied and enforced by the Treasury Department. A
check-list may help the draftsman avoid a few marital deduction
pitfalls:
a) The surviving spouse must have for life all the income from
the corpus of the trust, payable at least annually, and a power
to appoint the entire corpus in favor either of herself or her
estate. This power she must have alone.
b) This means all the income must be paid out, it cannot be
accumulated.
c) If a power of invasion is given, the spouse alone, not a
trustee, shall say when she needs principal. However, a power
of invasion during her life need not be given. She must have
either a power to appoint all during life, or at death.
d) Her power cannot be exercisable only in favor of children,
friends, or charity. It must be exercisable in favor of either
herself or her estate. To qualify it may be exercisable in favor
of her estate, her children and charity.
e) In default of her exercise of her power, the unappointed
corpus can pass as provided in the decedent's will. The Regulations specifically approve this.)
f) The surviving spouse must be entitled to all the income "for
life". Neither her interest in the income, nor in the property,
nor her power to appoint can be conditioned on her not remarrying. There will still be husbands preferring to support
Uncle Sam's nephews to their widow's second husbands.
g) The trustee may not, subject to certain permissions, 'hold
unproductive property. Nevertheless, the surviving spouse
may have the family home in the trust so long as she has the
beneficial use of it.
h) For ease and economy of investment, separate trusts may
be considered. The Regulations say that a will may create
'Reg.

105, Sec. 81.47 a

(c).
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more than one trust and that an individed interest in property
may constitute the corpus of a trust. Often a will has one
trust for the widow and one or more for the family. The hazard of running afoul 1. R. C. Sec. 812 (e) (1) (B) and (C) has
prompted lawyers not to give the trustee authority to consolidate the widow's trust with any other trust. Better practice points to a self-contained trust for the surviving spouse.
However, all powers need not be set out in full; those free of
any hazard can be incorporated by reference.
i) Trustees have usually been given a power to decide how
receipts and disbursements shall be credited as between income and principal. This may give the surviving spouse a tiny
bit less than all the income. Also. it gives the trustee a tiny
power to appoint principal. The Regulations show a reasonable interpretation of this usual administrative power. But
the trustee may not be directed to pay any undistributed income at the death of the surviving spouse to another named by
the decedent. The surviving spouse must have at least a power
to appoint to her estate. On her failure to appoint it may go
as the decedent directs.
OTHER DESIRABLE CLAUSES

(4) Some spendthrift clauses can be used. The trust can provide that her right to the income shall not be subject to assignment,
alienation, pledge, attachment or claims of creditors. It will be
disqualified for marital deduction if her absolute right to income
becomes discretionary in the trustee when she attempts to assign
or a creditor attempts to attach. 10
(5) Often the marital deduction is desired even if husband and
wife die in, or as the result of, a common disaster. When the marital deduction is desired, a clause must be drafted to prevent the
operation of the Simultaneous Death Statute." The clause should
establish the presumption that the surviving spouse survives. But
in common disaster situations, the marital deduction is not always
desired. By escaping estate taxes, the marital deduction interests
of the surviving spouse invite a possible second death tax, as well
as double administration expenses. Only a computation can tell
what balance should be struck between saving estate taxes in one
estate and paying second death taxes and additional administration
expenses in the second estate.
(6) A surviving spouse may elect against a fair testamentary
trust and receive one-half of the deceased spouse's property and
estate, both real and personal. 1 2 If she elects to take her statutory
one-half, it will qualify for marital deduction," but the marital de,0 I.R.C. Sec. 812 (e) (1) (B) ; Reg. 105, Sec. 81.47 a (c).
(1935) as amended S.L. 1943, p. 657.
11COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 176, sec. 12 (1)

12COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 176, sec. 37 and 226 (1935).
"Reg.

105, Sec. 31.47 a (f).
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duction value of her statutory one-half may be reduced by one-half
14
of all claims and funeral and administration expenses, and a prorata portion of the death taxes. This may increase the amount of
estate tax to be paid. No one knows the situation that will face the
surviving spouse. Why not give her a fully free choice? A clause
can say that if the surviving spouse elects the statutory one-half,
all death taxes, claims, widow's support allowance, funeral and administration expenses shall be charged against, and paid from, the
remaining one-half of the estate. Such a clause would increase the
value of the marital deduction. 15
(7) A disclaimer clause can do no harm; it may save many
dollars. The law has always allowed a surviving spouse-the all
or nothing choice-to disclaim everything under the will and also,
if she wishes, to waive her statutory one-half. The Code 16 and
the Regulations 11 make it clear that a surviving spouse may
promptly disclaim any interest. The disclaimed interest does not
qualify for marital deduction. The recommended disclaimer clause
can give her a right to disclaim all or any part of the gifts,
or only a part of a gift, and say what shall be done with the disclaimed gifts or interest. It may be better for a surviving spouse
to accept less marital deduction property and thereby avoid high
income taxes or subject the property to a heavy second death tax.
Future interests has not recently been the favorite subject of
most lawyers. The new marital deduction provisions have been
called " . . . masterpieces of obscure and obtuse statement . . .
Together they challenge every lawyer with a middle class client who
wants to get the greatest tax benefit from the marital deduction.

"YOUR FEDERAL INCOME TAX"
The 1949 edition of the Bureau of Internal Revenue booklet,
Your Federal Income Tax, is obtainable for 25c at the regional
office of the U. S. Department of Commerce, 210 Boston Bldg.,
Denver. This is a 138 page publication billed as "written to help
in solving most of the 1949 income tax problems of the average
taxpayer," and covers the latest laws, bureau rulings and court
decisions. It is equipped with a detailed index for quick reference
and, in response to requests, has added chapters this year on installment sales and appeals procedure.
Another "official government tax book", available at the same
place and price, is the 93 page Bulletin F-Income Tax Depreciation and Obsolescence. This is still in its 1948 edition, but from it,
it is alleged, "taxpayers and their counsel may obtain the best
available indication of the practices of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue" on this subject, which, if true, is quite a bargain.
Hanna v. Palmer, 6 Colo. 156 (1882).
See: I.R.C. Sec. 812 (e) (1) (E).
20I.R.C. Sec. 812 (e) (4) (A).
'R eg. 106, Sec. 81.47 a (e).
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PUBLIC RELATIONS-WHERE NOW?
SYDNEY H. GROSSMAN
Chairman, Public Relations Committees
Denver and Colorado Bar Associations

From the early days of our nation the members of the bar have
imposed upon themselves severe standards of dignity and ethics
believed to be in keeping with the high standing of the profession.
When our country was largely rural, this veil, so to speak, of dignified sanctity which separated the profession from the layman was
not harmful. Despite the aloofness of the lawyer, the services which
he was prepared and competent to render were well known to all
the members of his community. A client knew what to expect by
way of result from the employment of any particular lawyer, as
well as the amount he would probably have to pay to achieve the
results desired. With the tenacity which "in the good old days" perpetuated the doctrine of stare decisis, this veil of sacred solitude
has sheltered our profession from public scrutiny throughout the
years.
This veil, as I choose to call it, has prevented new and oncoming
generations from learning about the lawyer, the many and varied
legal services which he performs, and even the civic and philanthropic functions which he discharges with distinction and without
compensation. As the private and business life of the citizen
changed from a rural to an irldustrial life, and the villages grew
into the numerous and prosperous cities of today, the position of
the lawyer in society and his function therein became lost and forgotten in the complexities and confusion of present day American
life. Due to the traditional reticence of the lawyer to publicize his
own abilities, much of the general public today is ignorant of the
many services which a lawyer performs or is capable of performing.
The layman is afraid of high fees. He is not capable of choosing a lawyer. Many times he does not realize until it is too late,
that a lawyer should be consulted before entering upon a business
transaction, rather than afterwards. Indeed, he does not know that
a lawyer is almost his sole protection against the excesses of government itself and the violation of his constitutional guarantees. Conversely, he does not know that he should beware of the lawyer who
solicits his business. He does not know that a lawyer is a trained
negotiator of contracts, whether with labor unions, beet farmers,
cattlemen, or any other group. He does not know that almost every
tax problem is a legal problem which a lawyer alone is competent to
answer. The layman is not advised or informed that generally betEDITOR'S NOTE: This article is a condensation and slight revision of the address delivered
by Mr. Grossman at the.51st annual convention of the Colorado Bar Association at Colorado
Springs on October 15, 1949.
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ter settlements of claims for personal injuries and property damages can be obtained through the services of a lawyer than without,
due to the lawyer's ability to evaluate the claim properly. He readily accedes to the forceful suggestion of the insurance adjuster that
he disdain from hiring a lawyer and thereby obtain a (quick) settlement which in numerous instances is far less than the amount
to which he is justly entitled. He does not know that the lawyer is
a domestic counselor who takes a case to court as a last resort only.
He does not know when and why he should have a will.
BUT SPLENDID ISOLATION HURTS

That this policy of splendid isolation and aloofness has reacted
unfavorably to our profession must be obvious from the shabby
treatment the profession receives from the press, screen and radio.
Too often the lawyer is cast as the principal villain. The average
motion picture-goer things of the lawyer in terms of one who is
unscrupulous, who is deceitful and who uses his education and
training for an illegitimate purpose. The movie-goer believes that
the lawyer spends the bulk of his time in a court room trying criminal cases in which the District Attorney is trying to persecute the
defendant and the defendant's attorney is trying to acquit the guilty
defendant. But in the last scene the timid, shy, illiterate, frightened wench, in a sudden burst of refined oratory, perfect diction,
and the calm of a finished speaker takes over the spotlight, and
coupled with dramatics and tears, addresses the jury, causes the
judge to cry, finally turns her back on the entire court and addresses the audience, thus singlehandedly winning her own case.
Recently the comic strip "Orphan Annie" contained a defamatory
reference to the profession when it announced through one of its
characters that finding an honest lawyer was a job for a magic
whistle.
Compare the severe dignity of our profession with the conduct
of persons and companies in fields which have come to be known
as allied to the legal field. Bold and aggressive competition from
banks, title companies, collection agencies, real estate men, insurance men, so-called labor relations experts and tax experts, has educated the public to believe that when wills or trusts are involved a
banker is the person to consult; that when real estate is involved, a
title company or real estate man is the best and cheapest. "Don't
bother to get a lawyer; he will charge you too much !" is the common cry. Further, that when taxes are involved, the accountant
is the most efficient; and our labor relations experts have convinced many employers in large cities by aggressive solicitation
that lawyers should be left in their ivory towers.
Bar associations all over the country finally have recognized
the change in the status of the lawyer in our modern day economy
and the need of a dynamic public relations program. Most associations have appointed public relations committees for the express
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purpose of counteracting the drift away from the lawyer to other
persons in the so-called allied fields. What the drug houses have
done for the doctor and the dentrifice houses have done for the
dentists, it is submitted that the lawyer must do largely for himself. No such "angels," with the. possible exception of the law book
companies, are available to the legal profession.
Much of what has been said above is the composite of the results of surveys made recently by many bar associations throughout the country, and, in part the above material is excerpted from
the report of the Indiana Bar Association Committee on Public
Relations.
HOW SHALL AROUSED BAR PROTECT ITSELF AND THE PUBLIC?

We believe it can be safely said, that this re-education must be
performed through our own organizations if it is to be done at all.
The problem is "How shall it be done?" Your committee has attempted to evaluate the work of bar associations throughout the
country in this field and employ those media for dissemination of
news about lawyers that have been the most beneficial. Many states
have employed professional public relations counselors. The Minnesota Bar Association alone has appropriated $50,000.00 for its
public relations program this year. A total of approximately 30
states have active public relations programs. Others are contemplating it. Approximately 15 state and local bar associations have
employed professional public relations counselors. In the first
year of our existence, we have done likewise. Because you are all
familiar with our radio programs, the will pamphlets, and the excellent beginning commenced by the Junior Bar in the matter of
vocational guidance programs in the law schools and high schools,
I will not dwell upon this at length. Our committee has utilized
what we think and believe to be the best public relations media as
a composite of the programs throughout the entire country. We
have employed the use of: 1. Radio. 2. Newspaper advertising.
3. Circulars and pamphlets. 4.. Speakers' Bureau. 5. A public relations counselor to coordinate all of these efforts.
TIE "NEGATIVE ASPECTS"

So much for the affirmative, constructive phase of our public
relations program this year. But mention must be made of what
I choose to label the 'negative aspects' or if you please, the 'preventive measures' essential in this over-all picture. To be sure, in my
opinion, the negative aspect surpasses in importance that of the
other. In this connection, I mean that it is most essential on the
part of lawyers generally to avoid a bad press. Articles in newspapers and other media, tending to place the lawyers in an unfavorable role, on one or two simple occasions can probably vitiate
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and nullify the over-all good effects of an affirmative program
throughout an entire year.
May I say further in this connection that this type of prevention extends not only to the bar, but in many instances to our
judiciary as well. Too ofen the ill-considered, ill-advised, and
sometimes ill-tempered statements of our judiciary are the utterances that find their way into the public press. The newspapers
are only too eager, sometimes under the guise of newsworthy
stories, to publicize comments by judges which are ofttimes gratuitous, unnecessary and have no material relationship to the particular case being tried. The comments thus made serve no good
purpose but on the contrary, when afforded a degree of publicity
all out of proportion to their value, cast discredit on the entire profession.
That is the sort of thing I mean when I refer to the negative
aspects. We must avoid the kind of bad public relations which we
have been receiving as a result of our own thoughtless and careless
conduct. We have quite a large enough job, as it is, to combat those
influences outside our profession that seek to destroy the high
degree of stature and dignity which we once enjoyed. The conduct
of lawyers and judges, particularly in governmental positions and
in public office, bear the closest type of scrutiny, and they should
be particularly on guard to the extent that their public utterances
are exemplary at all times. I cannot stress this point too much.
What has been said here has not been meant in any sense disrespectful, nor without full deference to our judiciary. Most lawyers
are faithful and good public servants, but it is to those few who
are not to whom I have referred and those few generally reflect discredit upon all of us.
However proud we are of the program of our committee in
this initial year, we must nevertheless ask the question "Where
now?", "Where now?" This could be a logical stopping point for
this summary of the first year's program of our bar association.
We might be content with the conclusion that we have a job of
salesmanship and that we have launched a program to that end. Is
it not, however, even more appropriate to gaze into the imaginary
mirror of self-examination and ask ourselves like any other businessman who is attempting to sell his product: "What is the quality of that product?", "How good is it?" "Has it assumed and
measured up to the responsibility demanded of it under our American system of law and justice, or has it become self-satisfied?"
"Have we become stagnant by remaining stationary?" "Have we
failed to keep pace?"
To obtain the confidence and respect of the public at large we
must merit it; and to whatever extent lawyers are chargeable
with the present deficiencies in our legal structure, we must as-
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sume and shoulder the responsibility of effecting the corrective
measures.
PUBLIC RELATIONS BY PUBLIC SERVICE

In conclusion, my recommendation as a result of the first year
of experimentation on the public relations program of the state
bar association: That to the best of our ability we make some
definite strides in the profession, correcting some of the evils that
can be placed squarely on our own shoulders. Some of these are:
1. Restate administrative law. Clarify it. Simplify it. Reconsider the need for every single bit of it. Codify it. Index it.
Publish it.
2. Review the extent to which Congress has delegated authority to make this kind of law. Review the propriety of the delegation in each instance.
3. Consolidate and codify the state statutes under the same
considerations as the federal statutes. Rewrite them with the
clarity, simplicity and conciseness of the federal statutes, to promote public comprehension and observance of them and enable
judges who must interpret them to be sure of legislative intent.
Weed out all obsolete law.
4. Require all local governments to maintain an up-to-date,
indexed codification of their laws, available for public inspection.
5. Adopt or adapt the federal rules of criminal and civil procedure, retaining without fail the provisions for pre-trial and discovery. Provide for pre-trial fact-finding by courts.
6. Streamline the structure of every state court system needing it, to be rid of outmoded courts and clarify the jurisdiction of
every court.
7. Dignify once more the practice of criminal law. Teach it
more adequately in law schools. Through bar association agreement to serve, make defense counsel available to all accused persons in need of it and unable to pay for it.
8. Strengthen and extend the legal aid society movement.
Develop the lawyer reference plan further and extend it to additional cities. Experiment with the legal service office.
9. Give fresh impetus to the movement for uniformity in
state laws, and extend it to promote uniformity in doctrine, as
well as uniformity in particulars.
10. Stop the cancerous ever-varying "Law by Decree" of the
governmental bureaus.
What it all sums up to is simply that it is still the aspiration
of the American people to be free, free to govern themselves, to
govern themselves by law, by law that works and is real and has
meaning to them, the only kind of law they will obey.
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LETTERS TO THE EDITOR
GIFT TAXES AND MR. POPHAM

I read with interest the excellent article by Harold E. Popham
on "Joint Tenancy in Colorado." I thought it was well that he
pointed out the necessity of making a gift tax return to the State
of Colorado where the joint tenancy resulted in a gift to one of the
parties, and the amount thereof exceeds the exclusion allowed under
the gift tax statute.
Under the provisions of chapter 75-A, 1935 Colorado Statutes
Annotated, as amended, a specific exemption of $20,000 is allowed
to a wife, but the exemption is only $10,000 where the gift is to a
husband, child, father, mother, or any child or children legally
adopted as such, or any lineal descendant of any grantor born in
lawful wedlock.
It should also be noted that the exclusion of $2,500 applies only
to persons in Class A, to-wit, husband, wife, father, mother, and to
others therein stated and that the exclusion to a wife or widow of a
son, or the husband or widower of the daughter, or the grandfather
or grandmother, or a brother or sister under Class B is only $1,500,
and the exclusions to any other persons or corporations as listed in
Classes C and D is $1,000.
The amount of the exemptions also decrease according to the
classes in which the donees fall. For example, in Class B the exemption is only $2,000 and in Classes C and D the exemption is $500.
There appears to be some misunderstanding as to whether or
not the exclusion and exemption can be taken each year where gifts
are made to the same donee in succeeding years. The exclusion can
be taken annually, but in addition thereto, the exemption is also a
deduction except that the exemption is cumulative; and when the
total amount of the exemption is reached, either as a result of the
gift in one year or gifts made over a period of years, such exemption
can no longer be taken.
As Mr. Popham points out, the question of taxes should be cQnsidered not only in the establishment of joint tenancies but in the
making of other gifts as the exemptions under the gift tax law are
in addition to any exemptions which are allowed under the inheritance tax law.
Mr. Popham states that "on the death of a joint tenant only
one-half of the value at date of death is included in his estate for
inheritance tax purposes, regardless of who contributed to the purchase price." Section 8, chapter 85, 1935 Colorado Statutes Annotated, as amended, provides for such a division except as to coownership government securities and bank accounts, in which cases
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the amount actually contributed by the decedent is the taxable
amount. If the decedent contributed the entire amount, then the
entire amount would be taxable; if the decedent contributed only
part of the funds, then only that part would be taxable for inheritance tax purposes.
Harry H. Ruston, Inheritance Tax Commissioner

THE ARMY IS NO ALTERNATIVE TO JAIL,
THANK YOU
For the benefit of judges and other law enforcement officers
of the state, Lt.-Col. Earl W. Worley, Denver procurement officer
for the U. S. Air Forces, has requested DICTA to publicize the fact
that the regulations of the Armed Forces prohibit the enlistment
of any person found guilty of a felony. Moreover, contrary to
the impression of some persons heretofore, regulations prohibit
enlistment in the armed forces as an alternative to penal servitude.
FIRST DISTRICT ELECTS NEW OFFICERS
The First Judicial District Bar Association met at Golden on
December 16 and selected the following officers for the forthcoming
year: Arthur D. Quaintance of Jefferson County, president; George
Fischer of Adams County, vice-president; and John E. Fitzpatrick
of Arapahoe County, secretary-treasurer. Carl Cline was designated to represent the association the state Board of Governors.
Secretary of Commerce Charles Sawyer's report on Federal
transportation policies is available in booklet form at the department's regional office, 210 Boston Bldg., Denver. Price per copy
is 20c.

OUR "NEW

FACE"

As our more observant readers will have noted, with
the January issue of DICTA a new type face was adopted,
together with a restyling of the cover and contents. This
more modern dress, which we hope meets with your approval, was developed as the result of suggestions from
Dr. Alan Swallow of the University of Denver Press. Both
in appearance and in substance, the new DICTA is frankly
in the. experimental stage, and its editors solicit your comment and suggestions.
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